The Aussie Lad Who Found Gold 🪙, Got Kicked Out, But Still Walked Away with Millions 💰

🌍 The Discovery of a Billion-Dollar Gold Mine 

In late 2005, Paul Willis and fellow geologist Sam Garrett studied geological data from an old archive prepared by Placer Dome (a Canadian gold mining company) and spotted what they believed to be one of Indonesia's most promising untapped gold deposits in Tumpang Pitu, Banyuwangi, East Java 🗺️.

They dubbed it the Tujuh Bukit Project. Early assessments suggested the site held up to 5 million ounces of gold, putting the project’s potential value above USD 5 billion 💰.

Because Indonesia’s mining law at the time prohibited direct foreign ownership of mining licenses 🚫, Willis and Garrett established two offshore companies: Indoaust Mining Ltd (British Virgin Islands) and Indoaust Mining Pty Ltd (Australia). These vehicles partnered with PT Indo Multi Niaga (IMN), a local company owned by Maya Miranda Ambarsari and Andreas Reza Nazaruddin, two local entrepreneurs, to hold the exploration license (KP).

👑 Emperor Mines’ Early Promises

In 2006, Willis through his Aussie connection brought in a major investor: Emperor Mines, that would later merge with Intrepid Mines, a major listed Australian company. Backed by Emperor/Intrepid’s funding and Indoaust’s exploration know-how, IMN successfully obtained a general survey license in March 2006 and upgraded it to a full exploration permit by February 2007 ✅.

By mid-2007, independent reports estimated oxide gold and silver reserves of at least 3.1 million ounces 📊. Excitement peaked, and so did the complexity of ownership.

To formalize their partnership, the parties signed an Alliance Agreement in August 2007. Emperor agreed to invest AUD 50 million in exchange for a 70% economic interest in the project.

But this agreement was never fully executed ⚠️.

🔄 The Fallout: Willis Get Kicked Out and IMN Turns on Interprid

Tensions escalated in early 2008 because Willis allegedly tried to bring in a new investor, prompting Emperor and IMN to feel betrayed, and decide to jointly terminate the relationship.

On March 31, 2008, the alliance agreement expired. Shortly after, in April, Willis was physically removed from the site, and by mid-year, Emperor paid USD 2 million to Willis under a Termination and Release Agreement ✍️.

For Intrepid Mines (which had absorbed Emperor Mines), this seemed like a clean break ✂️ with Willis, and they could partner directly with the local company, IMN.

But the informal, nominee-based ownership structure in Indonesia meant that despite pumping in millions from 2006 to 2013, Intrepid never directly controlled the mining license. IMN, the local license holder, retained all legal rights ⚖️.

After Willis was out, it was IMN’s turn to do another legal manoeuvre. In a shocking turn , IMN quietly transferred its mining rights to a new company: PT Bumi Suksesindo (BSI), a company aligned with a new investor group led by prominent Indonesian tycoons, including Edwin Soeryadjaya.

This occurred around 2012–2013, effectively cutting Intrepid off from the mine it had financed for years (reportedly  Interprid had spent more than double than the original investment projection of AUD 50 million) 💣.

Outraged 😤, Intrepid filed a case in Indonesia’s State Administrative Court (PTUN) to challenge the legality of the license transfer.

Unfortunately Intrepid lost on procedural grounds. Since the mining license was in IMN’s name, not Intrepid’s, the court ruled that Intrepid lacked legal standing under Indonesian law. It was a painful lesson in the risks of nominee structures 📑.

🎯 Settlement and IPO Windfall

Intrepid prepared for the next final legal battles: appealing the Jakarta verdict and launching arbitration in Singapore under the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) 🏛️.  

But the new owners of BSI, backed by influential Indonesian business figures,preferred a more pragmatic resolution . After all, a prolonged legal war benefited no one and only delayed the project's progress ⏳.

In February 2014, a multi-party Master Settlement Deed was signed involving Intrepid, IMN, BSI, Reza, Maya, and yes: Paul Willis ✍️. The agreement offered a financial exit for the foreign players. Intrepid would receive USD 70 million, and Willis would get USD 10 million, both through Mandatory Convertible Bonds (MCBs) to be converted during the IPO of the new holding company: PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk 💹.

IPO and Closure 📈

PT Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk launched its Initial Public Offering on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on June 18, 2015. According to its prospectus, the settlement instruments: MCB Emperor for Intrepid and MCB Willis for Paul Willis, converted into shares, crystallizing their payouts 💳. With that, the protracted dispute over Tujuh Bukit came to an end.

Willis, once ousted with USD 2 million, ultimately walked away with USD 12 million—without ever holding a formal mining license 🏆.

🔑 Key Takeaways from the Tujuh Bukit Saga 

This case underscores the legal fragility of nominee structures in Indonesia, especially in the high-stakes world of mining . Foreign investors like Intrepid found themselves legally exposed despite years of funding, simply because they never held the license on paper.

In the end, the parties were fortunate because the company went public, and everyone reached a settlement, avoiding what could have been a prolonged and costly dispute."

But the saga also illustrates the unpredictable nature of business in emerging markets 🌏. Paul Willis, a geologist armed with data and a dream, went from founder to outsider, then to court plaintiff and finally, a financial winner, aided by the very people who once helped remove him .

The Tujuh Bukit story is a powerful cautionary tale for foreign investors: in countries with restrictive ownership laws like Indonesia, the legal structure can be just as critical—if not more so—than the underlying economic substance of a deal.

And ultimately, no matter how complex or contentious the dispute, Indonesians often find a way to reach an amicable settlement through negotiation and compromise.

Source: 

• Putusan PN Jaksel No.663/Pdt.G/2012/PN.JKT SEL

• PT. Merdeka Copper Gold Tbk IPO Prospectus